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 One of the recurrent attractions of combining an academic post with a practice at the 
bar is the tendency to find oneself coming across notionally obscure corners of land 
and housing law which present factual scenarios raising a combination of issues 
which from a  teaching or writing perspective one would rarely put together, and 
which in analytical terms present principles that one might instinctively think are 
indefensible, but which then appear credible on closer examination, only to seem once 
again ill-founded following rigorous scrutiny. Such was the case of Miss A; an elderly 
lady with a van, a flat in an almshouse and a demonstrably eccentric view of the 
world around her.  
 Miss A sought legal assistance from Shelter when possession proceedings were 
instituted against her in 2008. She had lived for a year or so in a self-contained studio 
flat in a small block of almshouses. She appeared to have exclusive occupation of her 
flat, and she paid a monthly fee of some £220 to occupy it. For any student at an early 
stage of inquiry into the intricacies of English housing law, the obvious presumption - 
flowing from the principles articulated by the House of Lords in Street v Mountford1 
and affirmed in Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Association2 - would be that 
Miss A had an assured shorthold tenancy of the premises.  
 However Miss A also had a written occupancy agreement from the owner of the 
almshouses, a body (hereafter called XYZ Homes) which was both a registered 
charity and a registered housing association. The scheme establishing XYZ Homes as 
a charity contained, inter alia, the following clauses;  
 
“22. Almshouses – the Almshouses belong to the Charity and the property occupied 
therewith shall be appropriated and used for the residence of alms people in 
conformity with the provisions of this scheme 
 
24 Qualification of Alms People – the alms people shall be poor pious widows or 
spinsters of good character who are not less than 57 years of age… 
 
34 Setting Aside Appointments 
 
1) The Trustees may set aside the appointment of an alms person of any alms person 
who in their opinion: 
                                                 
1
 [1985] AC 809; [1985] 2 All ER 289 (HL). 
2
 [1999] 1 WLR 150 (HL). 
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(a) persistently or without reasonable cause either disregards the regulations for the 
alms people or disturbs the quiet occupation of the almshouses or otherwise behaves 
vexatiously or offensively; or  
(b) no longer has the required qualification; or…. 
(d) is suffering from mental or other disease or infirmity rendering her unsuited to 
remain an alms person. 
 
2) Upon setting aside the appointment of an alms person the Trustees shall require 
and take possession of the rooms occupied by her. 
 
 
 The written occupancy agreement between XYZ Homes and Miss A did not identify 
her occupancy as a ‘tenancy’, but rather called it an ‘appointment’. Miss A was not 
described as a ‘tenant’, but as a ‘beneficiary of the charity’. Nor was the fee Miss A 
paid characterised  as ‘rent’, but as a ‘Maintenance Contribution’, which was initially 
set at £220 per month; (the label notwithstanding, Miss A had applied for and been 
granted housing benefit which covered the entire sum due). The agreement also 
contained the following provision: 
 
“8. Neither the Residents nor any relation or guest of theirs will be a tenant of the 
charity or have any legal interest in their almshouse”. 
 
 Miss A had certainly – so it appeared – not been an ideal occupant of her 
accommodation from the Almshouse’s perspective. Her behaviour in the premises in 
terms of her interactions with other residents and employees had been eccentric to the 
point that one might characterise it as mildly anti-social. More significantly she had – 
in evident breach of her occupancy agreement parked a dilapidated, untaxed, MOT-
less and rusty van in the communal front garden and had ignored repeated requests to 
move it. (Unlike Alan Bennett’s celebrated Miss Shepherd,3 Miss A did not actually 
sleep in her van but apparently used it for storage; she had no expectation – and 
certainly not a legitimate one – that it would ever again be roadworthy). The 
Almshouse’s main concern, however, was that it doubted that Miss A had actually 
moved into the premises on a permanent basis, but thought rather that Miss A had 
another home elsewhere. She denied this in her instructions to Shelter, saying that it 
had simply taken her a few months to feel settled in her new home, and that she had in 
the interim spent quite a lot of time staying with friends. 
 The Almshouse clearly took the view that Miss A was not to be believed, and served 
a series of notices on Miss A which purported to terminate her ‘appointment’ and 
requested her to leave the premises. She of course declined to do so, whereupon – 
after some delay engendered by Miss A’s perennial habit of writing long, rambling, 
largely irrelevant and  in part incomprehensible letters to the Almshouse in response 
to their various communications to her4 – possession proceedings were initiated. 
 
 
Drafting a defence 
 
  The instinctive response to the claim would be that it rested on a  misconceived 
presumption that the labels attached to Miss A’s occupancy of her home in the 
                                                 
3
 Most inexpensively available (£3.15 through Amazaon) in an edition published in 1999 by Profile 
books; (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Lady-Van-Alan-Bennett/dp/1861971222). 
4
 A trait which in one respect at least proved helpful to her case; see further p xx below. 
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agreement between the parties were determinative of her legal status.  The contrary 
presumption would be that because she had exclusive occupation of the premises for a 
term on payment of a rent she was necessarily an assured shorthold tenant of the 
Claimant. Reference would obviously be made to various passages of Lord 
Templeman’s forceful judgment in Street v Mountford: 
 
“If….residential accommodation is granted for a term at a rent with exclusive 
possession, the landlord providing neither attendance nor services, the grant is a 
tenancy; any express reservation to the landlord of limited rights to enter and view the 
state of the premises and to repair and maintain the premises only serves to emphasise 
the fact that the grantee is entitled to exclusive possession and is a tenant. In the 
present case it is conceded that Mrs Mountford is entitled to exclusive possession and 
is not a lodger. Mr Street provided neither attendance nor services….On the 
traditional view of the matter, Mrs Mountford not being a lodger must be a tenant”.5 
 
Street v Mountford also confirms that the labels which the parties to an occupancy 
agreement might attach to their relationship or its constituent parts has no bearing on 
what the legal effect of the agreement would be: 
 
“….If the agreement satisfied all the requirements of a tenancy, then the agreement 
produced a tenancy and the parties cannot alter the effect of the agreement by insisting 
that they only created a licence. The manufacture of a five-pronged implement for 
manual digging results in a fork even if the manufacturer, unfamiliar with the English 
language, insists that he intended to make and has made a spade”.6 
 
 
 Assuming that analysis to be correct, one would have expected a claim for possession 
against Miss A to have been pleaded (alternatively and/or additionally) in three 
distinct ways. 
 The first possibility would be for the Claimant to aver that Miss A did not occupy the 
premises as her ‘only or principal home’ within the meaning of the Housing Act 1988 
s.1. If that assertion were to be proven correct, Miss A would have only a contractual 
tenancy, which could have been determined by a properly served and valid notice to 
quit. Miss A could have no defence at all if that was indeed the fact of the matter. 
Even a Human Rights Act defence would not arise if the premises were not her home. 
On the basis of the instructions she gave to Shelter, any such claim would have been 
contested on the facts, with reliance being placed on a now quite substantial body of 
case law which indicates that the notion of ‘only or principal’ home in respect of 
assured and secure tenancies can properly encompass tenants who may be absent from 
the premises even for substantial periods of time.7 
 The second possibility would arise if the assertion that Miss A did not live in the 
premises could not be made out by the Claimant at trial. In those circumstances, she 
would be an assured shorthold tenant and therefore the notices served by the Claimant 
would be of no legal effect. Any possession proceedings would have to be begun by 
                                                 
5
 [1985] AC 809 at 826. 
6
 Ibid.  
7
 See for example Brent LBC v Cronin (1998) 30 HLR 43: Crawley BC v Sawyer (1988) 20 HLR 98 
(CA): Preston BC v Fairclough (1982) 8 HLR 72 (CA): R v LB Croydon, ex parte Toth (1988) 20 HLR 
576 (CA). For comment and analysis see S. Bridge, “The Security of Tenure of Absent Tenants’ (1988) 
Conveyancer and Poperty Lawyer 300: J. Luba et al, Defending Possession Proceedings ch.1, pp 199-
203 (2006 6th ed). 
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service of a Housing Act 1988 s.8 notice identifying a breach of the tenancy 
agreement, the particulars of which would likely be her refusal to move her clapped-
out van from the front garden. In respect of this claim, the Claimant would obviously 
have to prove the breach and convince the court that it was reasonable for a 
possession order to be made. The obvious response to any such claim would be to 
advise Miss A to get rid of her van straightaway, have her undertake not to bring it 
back, and assert that any anti-social behaviour she might have committed was too 
trivial and/or unlikely to be repeated to merit any kind of order being granted. 
 The third option would be for the Claimant – assuming Miss A to have been in 
residence for at least 6 months – to serve a Housing Act 1988 s.21 notice. If a valid 
s.21 notice is ‘given’ to the tenant, the landlord has a mandatory right to possession.8 
In all likelihood, the only defences which might arise to such a claim would be a  
(very speculative) Human Rights Act Kay `gateway A ‘ challenge to the compatibility 
of s.21 with art. 8 of schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act. It is improbable - given the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in R (Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing Trust9- 
that this particular Almshouse would have been a public authority/body amenable to 
judicial review for the purposes of a Kay ‘gateway B’ defence,10 nor – relatedly – that 
its decision to seek to evict Miss A would have been a ‘public function’ undertaken 
by an otherwise private body for HRA s.6 purposes. 
 Those expectations would apparently founder however on the Court of Appeal’s 
1998 judgment in Gray and Others v Taylor,11 which  while reported in the WLR is a 
judgment of sufficient obscurity not to feature at all in Jan Luba et al’s standard work 
of reference, Defending Possession Proceedings.12 Gray, it seems, deals a heavy blow 
to the argument that Miss A would have been an assured shorthold tenant. 
 
                                                 
8
 There seems top be no authority on the issue of whether the term ‘given’ in s.21(1) and s.21(4) is a 
concept distinct from that of ‘served’ in s.8. It might be suggested, given the draconian consequences 
of a properly ‘given’ s.21 notice, the term is used in contrast to that of ‘served’ in s.8 to require that a 
s.21 notice must be expressly brought to the attention of the tenant rather than simply - as may be the 
case in ‘serving’ a s.8 notice - delivering it to the premises or putting it in the post. 
9
 In the High Court; [2008] EWHC 1377 (Admin); [2009] 1 All E.R. 17. In the Court of Appeal; [2009] 
EWCA Civ 587; [2009] 4 All E.R. 865; [2009] H.R.L.R. 29. For comment see N. Billingham, “Private 
Act or Public Function? Weaver Sows Confusion in the Court of Appeal” (2009) J.H.L. 83.  
10
 The Court of Appeal in Weaver had narrowed the question to be answered under HRA 1998 s.6. The 
correct question was not – as had been posed in the Court of Appeal – whether or not London and 
Quadrant was a ‘public authority’ for the purposes of s.6. Rather one should ask if London and 
Quadrant’s decision to seek to evict Ms Weaver was a ‘public function’. In deciding the answer to the 
question was ‘Yes’, the Court of Appeal broadly endorsed the methodology used in the High Court . 
Relevant factors would be: whether (and if so in what amount) the landlord received grants from the 
Housing Corporation (a government body) to buy or develop new properties; whether a high proportion 
of its lettings were to persons nominated by local authorities and whether the landlord was statutorily 
required to co-operate with local authorities for this purpose; whether the landlord could be categorised 
as a commercial, profit-making (and thus presumptively private for HRA purposes) organisation; and 
to what extent the landlord was a result of government policy increasingly playing the role of provider 
of low cost accommodation previously undertaken by local councils. XYZ was obviously a charity 
rather than a commercial organisation, but it did not fall within any other of the Weaver criteria. 
 The allusion to a Kay defence refers to the judgment of the House of Lords in LB Lambeth v Kay  
[2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465. The judgment is too well known to require repetitious analysis 
here. See generally I. Loveland, “A Tale of Two Trespassers…” parts 1 and 2 (2009) 2 E.H.R.L.R  148 
and (2009) 4 E.H.R.L.R. 495: G. Griffiths, “Article 8 and Possession Proceedings – the Saga 
Continues” (2008) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer  437. 
11
 [1998] 1 W.L.R. 1093.  
12
 Nor is it mentioned in the leading academic work on housing law, D. Hughes et al, Text and 
Materials on Housing Law (2005). 
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Was Miss A a tenant ? Gray and Others v Taylor  
 
 The Defendant in Gray occupied an almshouse set up under a similar scheme to that 
establishing XYZ homes. Her occupancy agreement was also drafted in terms much 
like those of Miss X’s agreement. Her occupancy fee, however, was set at the 
extremely low level of no more than £2.50 per week. Ms Taylor had however been 
decidedly anti-social and unpleasant in her behaviour, and her almshouse wanted shot 
of her. She was therefore issued with what the Court of Appeal styled a ‘notice to 
vacate’. It is not clear from the judgment if the ‘notice to vacate’ was to be regarded 
as a notice to quit, and so subject to relevant common law and statutory rules as to its 
validity.13 That point was not in any event taken by the Defendant. The case was 
defended simply on the basis that – per Street v Mountford - Ms Taylor was an 
assured tenant.  
  Ms Taylor’s defence was rejected. The sole judgment, given by Sir John Vinelott, is 
not a model of clarity. It seems however to break down into three distinct but 
presumably inter-related parts. 
 The first and apparently dominant element of the judgment was that an almshouse 
‘appointment’ fell outside the general presumption laid out in Street v Mountford. 
After having quoted the passage from Street cited at footnote 5 above, Sir John then 
skipped a few lines in Lord Templeman’s judgment and continued: 
 
“However, it is important to bear in mind a subsequent observation which comes 
almost immediately after the passage I have cited, where Lord Templeman said:  
 
‘There can be no tenancy unless the occupier enjoys exclusive possession; but an 
occupier who enjoys exclusive possession is not necessarily a tenant. He may be 
owner in fee simple, a trespasser, a mortgagee in possession, an object of charity or a 
service occupier…. 
Sometimes it may appear from the surrounding circumstances that the right to 
exclusive possession is referable to a legal relationship other than a tenancy. Legal 
relationships to which the grant of exclusive possession might be referable and which 
would or might negative the grant of an estate or interest in the land include 
occupancy under a contract for the sale of the land, occupancy pursuant to a contract 
of employment or occupancy referable to the holding of an office’. 
 
That passage reflects an observation of Denning L.J. in Errington v Errington and 
Woods [1952] 1 K.B. 290, 298, cited with approval by Lord Templeman, at pp. 820–
821, where Denning L.J. said:  
 
‘Parties cannot turn a tenancy into a licence merely by calling it one. But if the 
circumstances and the conduct of the parties show that all that was intended was that 
                                                 
13
 These being respectively that the notice must be said to expire on the first or last day of the period of 
the occupancy agreement; see Precious v Reedie [1924] 2 KB 149: Queen’s Club Garden Estates v 
Bignell [1924] 1 KB 117: that there must be a minimum of 4 weeks notice given per the Protection 
from Eviction Act 1977 s.5; s.3; and that the notice – if given by the ‘landlord’ must contain the 
information identified in the Notices to Quit (Prescribed Information) Regs 1988  SI no.2201; (namely 
that the ‘landlord’ cannot evict the occupiers without a court order and that the occupiers can seek legal 
advice from a lawyer, law centre or Citizens Advice Bureau. 
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the occupier should be granted a personal privilege, with no interest in the land, he 
will be held to be a licensee only’. 
 
 Sir John Vinelott appeared to fasten on Lord Templeman’s reference to an ‘object of 
charity’ as being of great significance to Ms Taylor’s situation. He concluded on the 
basis of these passages that Ms Taylor was a ‘beneficiary’ or licencee, not a tenant. 
He was not dissuaded from this conclusion by the fact that Ms Taylor paid a regular 
fee for her occupancy. Rather he equated this sum with a service charge one might 
pay under a lease; it was not a ‘rent’.  
 Given that the fee charged to Ms Taylor was not to exceed £2.50 per week, that 
conclusion – on the facts of the case – is readily understandable. Unhappily, the 
judgment is couched in much more general terms and seems to have been intended to 
be (and has been taken to be)14 of universal application to almshouse occupancy 
arrangements. In that respect, Sir John Vinelott’s reasoning on this point is obviously 
and profoundly unsatisfactory. Two problems might be identified. 
 The first is that he appears to have elided the quite distinct phenomena of occupying 
a property which is owned by a charity with occupying a property as an ‘object of 
charity’. One might much more readily be thought to be an ‘object of charity’ if one is 
receiving from the charity a benefit at no cost to oneself – or, as was Ms Taylor, at 
markedly subsidised cost – than if one is paying for the benefit at something 
approaching the cost one would pay for the benefit from a non-charitable 
organisation. Had Miss Taylor been paying £50 or £60 per week – a level which was 
broadly comparable to that charged for similar accommodation by a local authority or 
housing association in the area – the suggestion that she was an ‘object of charity’ 
would seem notably less compelling. And particularly so if that fee was being met by 
housing benefit payments, which are intended to cover a person’s housing costs. 
A better way to analyse the position might be to suggest that where an almshouse 
charges its residents only a minimal – indeed tokenistic occupancy fee – then there is 
actually no intent between the parties to create legal relations and so no tenancy 
arises. The resident is an ‘object of charity’ because she is not in any meaningful 
sense legally obliged to ‘pay’ for her occupancy. But when she is charged a sum 
similar to that she might pay an RSL for an assured tenancy or to a local authority for 
a  secure tenancy  that classification is not immediately compelling. 
 The second objection to Sir John’s reasoning on this point is essentially one of 
constitutional law.  If Parliament wishes to prevent certain types of occupancy 
agreement being tenancies - or being particular types of tenancies - it need only say so 
in express terms. And if one turns to the relevant provisions of the Housing Act 1988 
one finds that Parliament has exercised this power in quite broad terms in respect of 
the assured tenancy. Indeed, among the expressly identified exceptions to the assured 
tenancy regime are – at Schedule 1 (‘Tenancies which are not secure tenancies’) para 
3 and 3A respectively are categories which would obviously embrace the ‘object of 
charity’ scenario: 
 
3. A tenancy under which for the time being no rent is payable. 
                                                 
14
 The judgment did not attract any substantial attention in academic or professional journals at the time 
it was decided. The few short comments its provoked in professional journals appeared to construe it as 
applicable to all almshouse residents. See for example J. Dollimore, “Do the Occupiers of Almshouses 
have Security of Tenure?” (1999) 1 Private Client Business 47; Case Comment, “Occupiers of 
Almshouses” (1998) Landlord and Tenant Review 2 (3) D40; P. Smith, The Law of Landlord and 
Tenant pp 58, 371 (2002, 6th ed). 
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3A. A tenancy— 
(a) which is entered into on or after 1st April 1990 (otherwise than, where the dwelling-
house had a rateable value on 31st March 1990, in pursuance of a contract made before 
1st April 1990), and 
(b) under which the rent payable for the time being is payable at a rate of, if the 
dwelling-house is in Greater London, £1,000 or less a year and, if it is elsewhere, £250 
or less a year. 
 
Parliament has similarly chosen to exclude lettings to students by higher education 
institutions or other designated providers, holiday lettings, agricultural tenancies and 
tenancies in properties with a resident landlord from the assured tenancy regime. No 
mention is made of almshouses. It is a rather trite point perhaps, but if Parliament has 
chosen expressly to exclude situations (a) – (f) from a particular legal regime then a 
court which concludes that unmentioned situation (g) is also excluded is straying into 
distinctly legislative functional territory.  
 Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeal’s judgment does not cross this boundary, as its 
conclusion does not recognise Miss Gray as having a tenancy which is not assured; 
(and so must be purely contractual). The judgment goes rather further by denying 
there is a tenancy at all. The headnote to the case famed the question before the court 
as being whether Miss Gray occupied qua tenant or licencee. And of course, it is the 
tenant/licencee dichotomy which lies at the heart of the House of Lords’ judgment in 
Street v Mountford. Sir John Vinelott did not in terms classify Ms Gray’s 
‘appointment’ as a form of ‘licence’, but it would seem that he did so classify it by 
implication when he invoked and approved the passage from Lord Denning MR’s 
judgment in Errington v Errington that was quoted above. For reasons that will 
become apparent below, we were concerned to establish that if Miss A’s rights of 
occupancy were not derived from a tenancy, then they were at least rooted in a sub-
species of licence rather than in some wholly distinct form of legal relationship. 
 It should also be observed that occupancy agreements for almshouse accommodation 
would be licences - and are expressly exempted from the secure tenancy provisions of 
the Housing Act 1985 (by Schedule 1 para. 12) - if the scheme establishing the charity 
does not empower it to grant tenancies. Since 1997, an almshouse could not in any 
event satisfy the landlord condition for the grant of a secure tenancy, so the exemption 
is largely of historical interest. But the fact that there is no analogous provision to 
para. 12 in the Housing Act 1988 with respect to assured tenancies might be thought 
to strengthen the presumption that the Street v Mountford principle bites on residential 
occupancy agreements made by bodies which cannot grant secure tenancies. 
 The second plank of the Court’s judgment in Gray rested on a presumption as to 
desirable policy outcomes, the naked nature of which was not at all well-concealed by 
being dressed up in ludicrously ill-fitting hypothetical clothes: 
 
“The creation of a tenancy of functional land would be inconsistent with the 
performance by the trustees of their duties as trustees of a charity, for the tenancy 
would impose a burden which might make it impossible for the trustees to ensure that 
occupation of an almshouse was restricted to almspersons who satisfied the 
qualifications set out in clause 36. For instance, an almsperson who inherited a 
substantial legacy or won a prize in a national lottery would no longer be a poor 
person and a proper object of charity. 
Mummery L.J., in the course of the argument, put forward a more extreme example, 
where all the residents of an almshouse joined together to buy a ticket in a lottery, 
transforming their fortunes when the ticket came up. They might all decide to stay 
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where they were, amongst familiar surroundings and with familiar neighbours. 
Lottery winners often announce that they do not intend that their good fortune should 
be allowed to change their pattern of life. The almshouse would then become 
something like a rich persons' club…..”. 
 
 That this dreadful scenario would ever occur might be thought a little unlikely. The 
Court was unable to identify an almsperson who had won the lottery (or the premium 
bonds – or in distant days past – the football pools) and then sought to stay put in her 
home.  
 We might also note that many Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) – including some 
of the largest in the sector - are registered charities. Many of them also identify their 
purpose as the provision of housing to people who are unable to afford properties - 
whether as owner-occupiers or tenants – in the private sector. Yet RSLs do not style 
their occupancy agreements as ‘appointments’; they charge ‘rents’ not ‘maintenance 
contributions’; and all of them seem to face with equanimity the supposedly 
horrendous prospect that tone or some of their tenants might win the lottery yet still 
wish to live in the rented social housing. And – obviously – local authorities qua 
landlords are now almost exclusively playing that role to tenants of quite limited 
financial means.  
 It may be that the Court in Gray did not have in mind situations where almspersons 
paid substantial fees for occupancy of their homes. The Court’s immediate concern 
was presumably to dispose of the case before it. But whatever force this part of the 
judgment may have had on the facts of Gray has of course been much diminished by 
the changed presumption introduced by the Housing Act 1996 as to whether an 
assured tenancy is an assured tenancy simpliciter or an assured shorthold tenancy. 
When Ms Gray took up occupancy of her home, the statutory presumption was that all 
assured tenancies were assured simpliciter rather than assured shortholds. For a 
landlord to create an assured shorthold tenancy - and so to be able to avail 
him/her/itself of the straightforward and prompt mandatory ground of possession 
arising under s.21 – the various pre-tenancy formalities specified in s.20 had to be 
complied with. That presumption was reversed by the Housing Act 1996 with respect 
to assured tenancies created since 28.02.1997.  Such tenancies are shorthold in nature 
unless they are expressly stated to be assured simpliciter. 
 Ms Gray fared no better in asserting that she might derive a certain fixity of 
occupancy from the terms of her ‘appointment’.  The Court of Appeal also indicated 
that the terms of Miss Taylor’s occupancy agreement - and whether they had been 
breached - were not something that could be evaluated and enforced by a court. Any 
presumptive jurisdiction that the court might have in that regard was, in Sir John 
Vinelott’s view, effectively ousted by cl. 51 of the scheme establishing the charity, 
which provided that: 
 
“If any question arises as to the regularity or the validity of any decision made by the 
trustees, then, under clause 51, that question falls to be decided by the Charity 
Commissioners and not by the court”. 
 
Whatever contractual entitlements Miss Gray might have were therefore a matter for 
the Charity Commissioners, not for the court. On quite what empirical basis the Court 
of Appeal considered this assertion to be well founded is something of a mystery. The 
inference which presumably underlay Sir John Vinelott’s assertion was that the 
Charity Commission would in effect act as an arbitrator and decide if the terms of the 
agreement had been breached. Assuming – quite reasonably – that the Charity 
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Commission qua arbitrator would provide both an expert and impartial forum for the 
resolution of any dispute, there would be no obvious substantive objection to the 
matter being dealt with in that forum rather than in the county court. 
 Miss A’s occupancy agreement contained the following term: 
 
“15. The trustees retain the power to set aside a Resident’s appointment for good 
cause, eg in the case of serious misconduct or if there is a breach of the regulations, or 
if he or she is no longer a qualified beneficiary or is a risk to other residents, as 
outlined in the Charity Commission Schemes referred to above”. 
 
The clause is rather a shambles from a drafting perspective, but from Miss A’s 
viewpoint offered up the possibility of arguing that she had a contractual right only to 
be evicted for ‘good cause’, and that whether or not good cause existed was a matter 
for the court to determine. Furthermore, she might have also have argued that c.15 of 
the agreement had to be construed in the light of the aforementioned cl.34 of the 
scheme establishing the charity, namely that: 
 
1) The Trustees may set aside the appointment of an alms person of any alms person 
who in their opinion: 
(a) persistently or without reasonable cause either disregards the regulations for the 
alms people or disturbs the quiet or disturbs the quiet occupation of the almshouses or 
otherwise behaves vexatiously or offensively; 
 
 However the scheme establishing XYZ Homes as a charity also had a provision 
similar to cl. 51 of the almshouse in Gray to the effect that the validity of any actions 
of the almshouses under the scheme was to be determined by the Charity 
Commissioners. In principle, at least, having the question of whether there was cause 
for Miss A to be evicted by the Commissioners rather than a court could have been 
acceptable from Miss A’s perspective. So, wondering if there was some credible 
foundation for the Court of Appeal’s view in Gray, we wrote to the Charity 
Commissioners in the following terms: 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
 
We are writing to you on behalf of Miss A. Miss A has instructed us to represent her in 
possession proceedings which have been issued against her by her landlord, the Trustees of XYZ 
Homes. 
XYZ Homes is a Registered Charity no. 111111. It also a Registered Housing Association no. 
222222. The charity was formed to provide what it calls ‘almshouses’ for impoverished people 
to use as their residences. 
The scheme establishing the charity includes the following provision: 
 
‘39. Questions under Scheme. – Any questions as to the construction of this Scheme or as to the 
regularity of any acts done or about to be done under this Scheme shall be determined by the 
Commissioners upon such application made to them for the purposes as they think sufficient.’ 
 
One of the grounds of defence which Miss A is advancing is a contention that the grounds on 
which the Charity can regain possession of her home are fixed by the terms of her `occupancy 
agreement’, and that the grounds are not met on the facts of the case.  
We are writing to ask if the Commissioners are willing to accept jurisdiction to resolve that 
factual dispute? Whether or not the Commissioners are prepared to do so is likely to be of some 
significance to the court that will hear the possession claim. 
If the Commissioners are willing to accept jurisdiction, could you please let us know as soon as 
possible and also give us details as to what information the Commissioners would require and 
what procedures would be followed in addressing the issue. 
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Yours sincerely 
 
 
 The reply, promptly sent, was as follows: 
 
Thank you for your letter… 
 
Clause 39 (questions under the scheme) refers to the Charity Commission’s power to interpret 
the scheme alone (for example what particular clauses within the scheme mean). Our power 
does not extend to the administration and management of charities. This means that we cannot 
assist with ‘occupancy agreements’. It is for the trustees of the charity and their legal advisers 
to determine whether Miss A has met the terms of her occupancy agreement. 
Unfortunately the Charity Commission has no jurisdiction and cannot intervene in disputes of 
the type set out in your letter. I apologise for being unable to assist on this occasion. 
 
Yours sincerely…. 
 
 
The Court of Appeal in Gray presumably did not bother to take any steps to establish 
if its assertion had any empirical defensibility: which apparently it does not. Whatever 
force that might therefore have been attached in Gray v Taylor  to this element of the  
court’s reasoning is rather bluntly negated by the Commission’s evident unwillingness 
and/or incapacity to involve itself in evaluating the merits of disputes between 
almshouse trustees (or ‘landlords’) and their occupants (or ‘tenants’). 
  
 
Massaging Gray: was Miss A an assured shorthold  tenant ? 
  
 It is one of the happy luxuries of the academic lawyer’s life that she can - in 
academic fora – restrict herself simply to identifying (with good explanations) the 
inadequacies of a judicial decision and expressing the view that the decision should be 
overturned. For that purpose Gray serves as a useful tool. Such analyses – however 
compelling they might seem to readers of learned journals – obviously takes one 
nowhere in a hearing in the county court; beyond enabling one to make the 
observation that one’s client wishes to reserve the right to challenge the correctness of 
the particular decision in the appropriate appellate forum. Since - in respect of Gray – 
that forum would be the Supreme Court – any such challenge would seem a very long 
way away. 
 In the event, we sought to distinguish Gray from Miss A’s case in several ways. As is 
often the case in possession proceedings, the directions issued by the county court in 
XYZ Homes v Miss A meant that her initial defence would have to be filed before 
Shelter had had sight of Miss A’s full housing file; Miss A herself had furnished us 
with an eclectic but presumptively incomplete account of her correspondence with the 
trustees. Our defence was consequently liberally sprinkled with reservations of a right 
to amend or supplement the defence in the light of yet to be revealed documentation. 
 We began in this way: 
 
  
Ground 1. The Defendant occupies her home qua assured shorthold tenant. 
 
3.  Paragraph 3 of the Particulars of Claim is admitted to the extent that the 
Defendant occupies the premises in pursuance of an agreement dated 16th 
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February 2007. It is denied, for reasons particularised below, that the 
agreement is an ‘appointment’.   
 
  In respect of the sub-paragraphs of Paragraph 3 of the Particulars of Claim:  
 
(a) It is admitted that the said Letter of Appointment states that the Defendant 
would pay a ‘maintenance contribution’ of £220 on the first day of each 
month. It is denied that this payment is a ‘maintenance contribution’. The 
Defendant avers that the payment is rent. 
 
(b) It is admitted that the said Letter of Appointment states that the Defendant 
would not be a tenant of nor have any legal interest in the property. The 
Defendant avers that wording of the agreement and the intention of the 
Claimant do not determine the effect of the agreement, and the Defendant 
further avers that the effect of the agreement between the parties was to 
create an assured shorthold tenancy. 
 
PARTICULARS 
 
(i) The premises are a self-contained studio flat. The flat has its own entrance. The 
Defendant does not share any part of the premises with any other person. The 
Defendant has exclusive possession of the premises, let to her on a monthly periodic 
basis, on payment of a rent of £220 per month. 
 
(c) It is admitted that the said Letter of Appointment states that the Claimant would 
retain the power to set aside the Letter of Appointment and/or the Defendant’s 
licence. However, insofar as that assertion derives from cl. 15 of the agreement, the 
relevant clause continues ‘for good cause’. For the reason particularised at paragraph 
3(b) above, it is denied that the Claimant has such power. The agreement inasmuch 
as it created an assured shorthold tenancy cannot be determined by the Claimant 
other than by securing an order of the Court. 
 
 
4. It is acknowledged by the Defendant that the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal in Gray and Others v Taylor  [1998] 1 WLR 1093 indicates that some 
almspersons will not occupy their premises as assured tenants. The Defendant 
will seek to distinguish Gray from her own case, on the bases that:  
 
(i) While Miss Gray averred that she had an assured tenancy of her home, the 
Defendant avers only that she has an assured shorthold tenancy, which 
tenancy can promptly be terminated via the s.21 procedure; and 
 
(ii) Ms Gray paid only a ‘maintenance charge’ fixed at a maximum of £2.50 per 
week, while the Defendant pays some £50+ per week; and  
 
(iii)   There is no prohibition in the scheme establishing XYZ Homes which 
prevents the Claimant from creating a tenancy in respect of its almshouse 
accommodation. The scheme provides simply (at para 22) that the 
almshouses shall be used ‘for the residence of almspeople’; and  
 
(iv)  The Claimant’s scheme expressly provides that residents shall have 
‘possession’ of their accommodation; cl. 32; cl. 34(2). 
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Still massaging Gray: did  Miss A have some contractual security of tenure ? 
 
In the event that the argument on the assured shorthold point were to be lost, we 
sought to argue that Miss A derived some significant degree of protection from the 
terms of her occupancy agreement. The defence continued: 
 
 
In the alternative  
 
 
Ground 2. If the Defendant does not occupies her home qua assured shorthold tenant, 
she has a contractual entitlement qua licencee of the premises that her occupancy can 
be ended by the Claimant only if the Court is satisfied that there is ‘good cause’ for 
the Claimant so doing. 
 
8.  If the Defendant occupies the premises under a licence or ‘appointment’ , 
then insofar as the Claimant has a power to terminate the licence that power 
is constrained by cl.15 of the agreement to be exercised only for ‘good 
cause’. 
 
 
9. The Defendant denies that there is any such ‘good cause’, and puts the 
Claimant to strict proof thereof at trial. 
 
 
10.  Further the Defendant observes that the scheme establishing the Claimant as 
a charity; 
 
(i) restricts the power of Trustees to recover possession to four grounds; cl. 
34(1).  
 
(ii) precludes the trustees from making any regulations for the government of the 
almshouses which are ‘at variance or inconsistent with the terms of the 
scheme’; cl 35; and  
 
 
11. The Defendant avers that insofar as the Claimant asserts that there is ‘good 
cause’ to terminate the Defendant’s occupancy of her home, any such ‘good 
cause’ must be restricted to the factors identified in cl. 34 of the scheme, and 
the Claimant is put to strict proof of such good cause. 
 
 
12. The Defendant further asserts that insofar as the Claimant’s scheme purports 
to grant to the Charity Commissioners an exclusive power to determine if the 
Claimant’s is acting qua licencor/trustee in accordance with the said scheme, 
the Charity Commissioners have decided that they have no jurisdiction to 
consider the dispute between the Claimant and the Defendant. 
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Challenging Gray: a Kay ‘gateway A’ defence 
 
 By the time XYZ began proceedings against Miss A, the House of Lords had issued 
judgment in LB Lambeth v Kay15 and the ECtHR had handed down its opinion in 
McCann v The United Kingdom.16 The House of Lords’ response to McCann – 
Doherty v Birmingham City Council17 – appeared just as Miss A’s defence was being 
drafted. 
 We had already taken the view that there was no realistic scope to make a Kay 
‘gateway B’ defence (ie that XYZ Homes was acting unlawfully in a public law sense’ 
in initiating and/or continuing to seek to have Miss A evicted from her home) on these 
particular facts. As noted above, it seemed most unlikely that XYZ Homes would 
have been regarded as a public authority or to have been carrying out a public 
function in bringing proceedings against Miss A. 
 We did however see some merit - assuming we lost our argument seeking to 
distinguish Miss A’s case from Gray - in pleading that the rule in Gray was per se 
incompatible with art 8 of Schedule 1 of the HRA 1998. The upshot of the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Gray is that no court has any power to form any view at all on 
the substantive merits of an almshouse’s decision to evict an ‘appointee’ from her 
home. It is not even open to a court – if the claimant is not amenable to judicial 
review – to evaluate the decision against orthodox administrative law criteria. This 
situation appears presumptively inconsistent with the ECtHR’s assessment in McCann 
of the effect of Art 8 ECHR as a matter of general application in all possession 
proceedings: 
“50 The Court is unable to accept the Government's argument that the reasoning in 
Connors was to be confined only to cases involving the eviction of gypsies or cases 
where the applicant sought to challenge the law itself rather than its application in his 
particular case. The loss of one's home is a most extreme form of interference with 
the right to respect for the home. Any person at risk of an interference of this 
magnitude should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure 
determined by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant principles under 
Art.8 of the Convention, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his right of 
occupation has come to an end”.  
 Relying on this passage, we pleaded: 
 
 In the alternative  
 
Ground 4. Kay ‘gateway A’ defence. The rule in Gray and Others v Taylor  is 
incompatible with Art 8 of Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
                                                 
15
 [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 A.C. 465. 
16
 (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 40; [2008] H.L.R. 40. 
17
 [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367. Doherty seems to have been widely taken as confirming that a 
Kay ‘gateway B’ can now invoke all recognised grounds of judicial review. There is no apparent 
consensus on whether the case has also authorised courts to apply a more stringent test than 
Wednesbury irrationality when assessing the substantive merits of a landlord’s decision to seek 
possession of someone’s home. See generally Loveland op cit. n.xx supra: A. Arden “Doherty: how far 
did the pendulum swing” (2008) 6 J.H.L. 93. See also the comments of Collins J in Defence Estates v 
JL [2009] EWHC 1049 (Admin) at para 78; “[W]e have three House of Lords' decisions which have 
left the law frankly in something of a mess”. 
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13. The Defendant accepts that the Claimant is not a body amenable to judicial 
review nor a public authority per s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 nor is it 
performing a public function within the meaning of s.6 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 in seeking possession of the premises. 
 
 
14. The Defendant asserts that if the rule in Gray v Taylor  controls this case, then 
that rule is incompatible with Art 8 of schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 
1988. 
 
 
15. The Defendant avers that the said incompatibility arises because if the rule in 
Gray v Taylor  controls this case, the court must make an immediate  
possession order in favour of the Claimant without having given any 
consideration to the proportionality of the Defendant being evicted from her 
home. 
 
 
16. The granting of a summary order of this nature is inconsistent with the 
meaning of Art 8 ECHR as adumbrated by the ECtHR in McCann v United 
Kingdom 2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 40; [2008] H.L.R. 40  (esp at para 50).  
 
 
 Quite how far this would take us - even assuming the trial court were to accept our 
reasoning on the incompatibility point – was unclear. There seems to be a widespread 
presumption in housing law circles that the effect of Lord Bingham’s judgment in 
Kay18 (in respect of which on this point all seven of the judges were in agreement) is 
that a lower court is bound to apply the ruling of a higher court even if it is satisfied 
that the ruling is inconsistent with a later judgment of the ECtHR. In such 
circumstances, the correct way for a lower court to proceed would be to hear 
argument on the point and – if it considered the Defendant’s argument well-founded – 
to give judgment for the Claimant in accordance with the binding authority but grant 
permission to appeal.   
 A narrower reading of Lord Bingham’s reasoning would suggest that this principle 
need not apply when the ‘binding authority’ in question was reached without any 
reference to or consideration of Convention jurisprudence. A county judge would 
perhaps have to be unusually bold to accept that argument, and in the expectation that 
we would come before  a judge with a conservative approach to the question of the 
HRA’s impact of the doctrines of precedent and judicial hierarchy we pleaded the 
point in the following way: 
 
 
17. The Defendant accepts that per Kay a lower court is bound by the judgment 
of any higher court as to the compatibility of a rule of common law with any 
Convention Right, notwithstanding any subsequent decision of the ECtHR 
which indicates an incompatibility between the said rule of common law 
provision and the relevant Convention Right; (LB of Lambeth v Kay [2006] 
UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 at paras 40-45 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
 
                                                 
18
 [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 A.C. 465 at paras 40-45. 
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18. However, the Defendant will maintain that a lower court is not bound by a 
higher court’s ruling on a rule of common law if that ruling is prima facie 
incompatible with a Convention Right and was reached prior to the HRA 
coming into force and without any consideration at all being given by the 
higher court to the requirements of the HRA 1998 Schedule 1 and/or the 
ECHR. The Defendant relies upon Kay [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 at 
para 45 per Lord Bingham. 
 
19. The Defendant invites the court to reconcile Gray with the requirements of 
Art 8 of Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1988 by reading it down to the 
extent that a resident of an almshouse who has exclusive occupation of the 
premises for a term whether fixed or periodic on payment of a substantial fee 
occupies her home qua assured shorthold tenant.  
 
 
20. If the court considers itself bound to apply Gray notwithstanding having 
conclude that Gray is prima facie incompatible with Art 8 of Schedule 1 of 
the Human Rights Act 1988, the Defendant reserves the right to challenge the 
correctness of Gray in the appropriate appellate forum. 
 
 
 Having offered up a potentially elaborate argument on this point, we then ventured 
back onto rather more mundane legal territory. 
 
 
Accepting Gray – has the Claimant served a valid notice to quit ? 
 
 The penultimate ground of defence was one which – if successfully argued – could 
have only a short term, delaying effect on XYZ’s Homes attempts to have Miss A 
evicted. The trustees had begun the process without having sought any legal advice 
and were evidently unfamiliar with the legal niceties relating to the validity and 
service of a ‘notice to quit’.19 They had served a series of notices on Miss A over a 
period of several months, each of which was evidently flawed from either a common 
law or statutory perspective. 
 This element of the defence relied in part on the provisions of the PFEA 1977. In 
express terms, those provisions apply presumptively only to ‘tenancies’ or ‘licences’. 
Parliament has also specifically excluded certain types of tenancy or licence from the 
relevant statutory protection. None of those exclusions referred to almshouses or their 
occupants. We were conscious however of the possibility that the Claimant might 
seek to argue that an ‘appointment’ was neither a tenancy nor a licence, and so was 
wholly outwith the scope of the Act (and associated common law rules).  
 
 
In the alternative 
 
Ground 5. The Claimant has not served a valid notice to quit determining the 
licence/appointment 
 
                                                 
19
 As one of the trustees of XYZ Homes (a very polite lady in her 60s wearing a twinset and pearls) 
told me at court on the day of the first hearing in the matter: “We have never had to do anything like 
this before”. 
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21. If the Defendant occupies the premises under a licence or ‘appointment’, it is 
a periodic monthly licence or ‘appointment’ in respect of which she is 
obliged to pay a regular monetary sum of (initially) £220 per month. 
 
 
22. Unless the Defendant’s permission to occupy her home falls within the 
‘excluded licence’ provisions of PFEA 1977 s.3, a notice served by the 
landlord to end the licence is ineffective unless it complies with the 
requirements of PFEA 1977 s.5(1A).  The Defendant avers that this licence 
does not fall within PFEA 1977 s.3. 
 
 
23. The notice served on 19th September 2007 – of which service is admitted - 
does not comply with S.5(1A) and therefore the Defendant’s licence to 
occupy her home has not been determined by the said notice: 
 
PARTICULARS 
 
  (i) The notice did not give at least 4 weeks notice of the termination. 
 
  (ii) The notice does not contain the prescribed information. 
 
 
 24. The Defendant relies upon the PFEA 1977 s.5. 
 
 
25.   The notice served on 22nd January 2008 - of which service is admitted - does 
not comply with S.5(1A) and therefore the Defendant’s licence to occupy her 
home has not been determined by the said notice: 
 
PARTICULARS 
 
  (i) The notice does not contain the prescribed information. 
 
 
26. Further, the notice served on 22nd January 2008 is invalid at common law 
because it is not said to expire on a day which is either the first or last day of 
a term of the licence. 
 
 
27. The Defendant relies upon the PFEA 1977 s.5 and upon Precious v Reedie 
[1924] 2 KB 149: Queen’s Club Garden Estates v Bignell [1924] 1 KB 117. 
 
 
28. The notice served on 2nd April 2008 – of which service is admitted - is invalid 
at common law because it is not said to expire on a day which is either the 
first or last day of a term of the licence. 
 
 
 Thereafter, XYZ Homes had sought legal advice, and subsequently served a notice 
which satisfied common law and statutory requirements. XYZ’s lawyers had however 
overlooked the point that the occupancy agreement did not make provision for the 
services of notices by post by the trustees, which was apparently how the notice was 
sent to Miss A. She claimed not to have received it. On this issue at least, her habit of 
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writing long letters in response to communication she had received from the trustees 
proved helpful. She had provided us with copies of the letters she had sent in reply to 
each of the three invalid notices. There was no response of any sort to the fourth 
notice, an omission which we felt was cogent evidence that she had not received the 
notice. While there is some ambiguity about just what amounts to adequate service of 
a notice to quit, we considered there was sufficient authority to support the argument 
that in order for the notice to be effective it had to have come to Miss A’s attention.20 
The final element of our defence was thus the most straightforward: 
 
 
29. As to the notice of 5th May 2008, it is admitted that the notice is in 
compliance with the requirements of the common law and of the PFEA 1977 
s.5. 
 
 
30. Service of the notice is not admitted, and the Claimant is put to strict proof 
thereof. 
 
 
31. The Defendant relies upon LB Wandsworth v Attwell (1995) 27 HLR 536: 
Trustees of Henry Smith’s Charity v Kyriacou (1990) 22 HLR 66 (CA). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Having filed Miss A’s defence, having received a robust reply from the Claimant and 
having secured an extension of Legal Services Commission funding to take the matter 
to trial, we found the legal ground cut from beneath our feet by Miss A’s decision that 
she actually did not want to live in her almshouse any more. And having found a new 
home which better suited her personality and circumstances, she moved out some 
weeks before the case was due to come on for trial. As I understand it, she left her van 
behind.  
 While her decision no doubt saved the almshouse and the Legal Services 
Commission a substantial amount of money in legal costs, it is perhaps unfortunate 
from a wider public interest perspective that the issues raised by her case were not 
addressed by a court. The almshouse sector plays only a very small part in 
quantitative terms within the United Kingdom’s social housing sector. It appears that 
there are some 1800 separate Almshouse Charities, which in total provide 
accommodation for around 36,000 (mostly elderly) people.21 There is no basis to 
think that the trustees of the various almshouses (most/all of whom serve as trustees in 
an unpaid capacity) act to any significant extent in a way that is insensitive to or 
abusive of residents’ occupation of their homes. Although one might make just the 
same observation in respect of most RSLs, to whom the full rigours of the Street v 
Mountford principle are invariably extended. 
 One should also recall that the implication of Gray is not just that almshouse 
residents are deprived of (even a rudimentary form of) security of tenure. The 
surviving spouse or civil partner would have no right to succeed to an appointment in 
                                                 
20
 Cf Luba et al op. cit pp 268-270 and sources cited therein. 
21
 See www.almshouses.info/  – the website of the Almshouse Association. For a history of the 
almshouse movement and its traditions see B. Jobson, Houses of Noble Poverty (2008) 
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the way he/she would be entitled to succeed (per Housing Act 1988 s.17) to an 
assured shorthold tenancy.  
 More broadly, residents are also unable to rely upon the implied terms that attach to 
all short term periodic tenancies of residential premises. Perhaps the most important 
of those are the landlord’s repairing obligations imposed by s.11 of the Landlord and 
Tenant Act 1985. Miss A’s occupancy agreement contained an express term similar to 
the s.11 requirement, but in the absence of any such term residents would have no 
effective remedy for even substantial disrepair to their premises.  Nor could residents 
invoke the covenant of quiet enjoyment against the almshouse or persons claiming 
under it. Miss A’s occupancy did not contain any express term to this effect and there 
is no reason to suppose her agreement was atypical of those in use in the sector as a 
whole. Additionally, applying the reasoning of the House of Lords in Hunter v 
Canary Wharf,22 an almshouse resident would have no capacity to sue either her 
landlord or any adjoining occupant for nuisance-causing activities which interfered 
with the amenity value of her home. It perhaps compounds rather than negates the 
unsatisfactory situation illustrated by that last point that, by the same token, the 
resident herself could not cause a nuisance to others by misbehaving in her home 
since she is not in possession of the land. None of these points seem to have been 
considered by the Court of Appeal in Gray. 
 There seems little prospect that any government would be sufficiently concerned by 
the implications of Gray to promote a legislative reversal of the decision, and it is 
likely to be quite some time before the question again comes before the higher courts. 
When it does so however, it might be hoped either that the opportunity is taken to 
reverse the decision is limited in its reach to the period when any tenancy would have 
been assured rather than assured shorthold in nature and/or to contractual relationship 
in which residents pay no more than a token cost for their occupancy of their homes.  
                                                 
22
 [1997] AC 655. 
